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Abstract. In recent years pirate attacks against shipping and oil ﬁelds
have continued to increase in quantity and severity. For example, the
attack against the Exxon Mobil oil rig in 2010 oﬀ the coast of Nigeria
ended in the kidnap of 19 crew members and a reduction in daily oil
production of 45,000 barrels, which resulted in an international rise in
the price of oil. This example is a perfect illustration of current weak-
nesses in existing anti-piracy systems. The SARGOS project proposes
an innovative system to address this problem. It takes into account the
entire threat treatment process; from the detection of a potential threat
to implementation of the response. The response to an attack must take
into account all of the many parameters related to the threat, the poten-
tial target, the available protection resources, environmental constraints,
etc. To manage these parameters, the power of Bayesian networks is har-
nessed to identify potential countermeasures and the means to manage
them.
1 Introduction
World oil production is spread over more than 10,000 oﬀshore ﬁelds, each of
which requires tools and equipment to extract, process and temporarily store oil,
and vessels that can transport the hydrocarbons between the point of production
and the point of consumption.
Modern maritime piracy is currently the major threat to the security of these
energy production installations and the maritime shipping of oil.
Monitoring methods, and above all protection measures are the major weak-
nesses in the detection of a threat on such installations. They tend to be
ineﬀective and limited in the extent to which they can be tailored to a par-
ticular situation. Finding a system that can manage the safety of oil ﬁelds, and
provide both suitable protection and eﬀective crisis management is of primary
importance.
The SARGOS project is a response to this need. It proposes a global system
in the ﬁght against acts of piracy committed against oil industry infrastructure.
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This paper discusses the issues surrounding acts of oil ﬁeld piracy. It de-
scribes in detail a method for the planning of countermeasures. Notably, it uses
a Bayesian network to model the situation using two diﬀerent inputs: the Piracy
and Armed Robbery database of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
and the consolidated knowledge of experts in the domain. The results are tested
using realistic and comprehensive pirate attack scenarios.
2 Problem Deﬁnition and Research Objectives
The infrastructure of the oﬀshore oil industry is subject to a constantly rising risk
of piracy. These acts have repercussions both on local operations and globally.
This section describes the economic and political challenges related to these
attacks. It highlights an increasingly insecure context, where the actors involved
in the oﬀshore oil industry are helpless to protect themselves, and the current
tools do not eﬀectively protect infrastructure. Finally, we outline the SARGOS
project, illustrate its potential contribution to ﬁnding new ways of dealing with
these issues and demonstrate their relevance.
2.1 Political and Economic Challenges
The oﬀshore oil industry is growing rapidly. Oﬀshore oil extraction currently
accounts for about one-third of global oil production. Despite its scarcity, this
source of energy is under active exploration in many parts of the world.
From an economic perspective, it is important to highlight that attacks on
such infrastructure generate signiﬁcant additional costs (ransom payments, in-
surance premiums, the installation of security equipment etc.). These additional
costs directly aﬀect the price of oil in the international market.
From the political perspective oﬀshore oil ﬁelds are an interface between the
activities of the oil industry and the maritime world. The legal status of oil
rigs is complicated, although this is due more to the heterogeneity of applicable
regulations than the absence of a body of law. This complexity can result in
political conﬂicts between nations; it is often the case that the rig is located in
one country, while the company operating the platform is located in another.
The importance of oil installations to the world economy and global indus-
try, and the consequences that can arise from acts of piracy provides a strong
incentive to better protect these assets.
2.2 Context and Operational Needs
Despite the fact that attacks against oil ﬁelds are infrequent and above all,
receive little media coverage, they are of great cause for concern because of the
serious consequences for both crew and infrastructure.
Infrastructure managers, employees and safety oﬃcers no longer want to see
commercial assets become the subject of large ransoms. Nor do they want to
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continue to see crewmen injured, traumatized, held under extreme conditions
for long periods of time, or even killed. For their part, insurers do not want to
continue to insure highly expensive risks for an indeﬁnite period of time. Finally,
nations want to see an end to the situation where the price of oil is aﬀected by
such events.
The recent attacks are a perfect illustration of the weakness of existing anti-
piracy tools. Currently, the safety of oil installations is provided by so-called clas-
sical tools (radio identiﬁcation, radar, Automatic Identiﬁcation Systems, etc.).
Despite their usefulness in helping to detect threats, they cannot distinguish be-
tween diﬀerent types of hazard (ﬁshing boats, jet skis, tankers, etc.). Moreover,
their eﬀectiveness depends on many and various parameters that are related to
the environment as well as technical and operational constraints.
The proposed solution is therefore to increase the degree of infrastructure pro-
tection by developing a new system (SARGOS), which is capable of generating
an alarm and can set in motion an internal and external response to a conﬁrmed
intrusion.
2.3 The Contribution of the SARGOS Project
The SARGOS project (Syste`me d’Alerte et de Re´ponse Gradue´e OﬀShore/Gradu-
ated Oﬀshore Response Alert System) aims to meet this new need to protect
vulnerable civilian infrastructure, which is exposed to acts of piracy or terror-
ism carried out at sea. The project aims to design and develop a comprehensive
system that takes into account the whole threat treatment process, from the
detection of a potential threat to the implementation of the response. It can be
integrated into the infrastructures operations and respects regulatory and legal
constraints.
The project is funded by the French National Research Agency (L’Agence
Nationale de la Recherche)1 , and is approved by other regional bodies in France.
The development of a comprehensive protection system requires multi-disciplinary
technical skills; challenges include the automatic detection and identiﬁcation of
threats, assessment of potential risks, and management of an appropriate re-
sponse. The functional outline of the SARGOS system (Figure 1) shows how the
threat is processed.
In the context of the current discussion, there is insuﬃcient emphasis on the
preparation of the diagnosis and the way in which parameters and constraints
related to attacks should be managed. In order to address these shortcomings, we
propose a new approach that can automatically draw up response plans, tailored
to the type of intrusion detected.
1 The SARGOS project brings together many diﬀerent private sector organisations
(including the French naval shipbuilder, DCNS and SOFRESUD, a supplier of
high-tech equipment to the defence industry) and public research centres (including
ARMINES, a French contract research organisation and Te´SA, Telecommunications
for Space and Aeronautics).
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Fig. 1. Functional outline of the SARGOS system
3 Method
This paper will focus particularly on the contribution of a Bayesian inference
approach, which uses input from an established database and the knowledge of
experts in the maritime domain. The Bayesian network is used in the response
planning process and the aim is to prepare a response that is appropriate, grad-
uated and which can adapt as the threat evolves. Database information and the
knowledge of oil industry experts are used together to address the lack of both
a priori knowledge of the object in question and learning from experience in the
applied domain.
The Bayesian network is used to model this information and knowledge; the
tool is based on Thomas Bayes theorem (1), which forms the basis for probability
theory.
(
P (B/A) ∗ P (A)
P (B)
)
= P (A/B) (1)
A Bayesian network is a model that represents knowledge, and makes it possible
to calculate conditional probabilities and provide solutions to various types of
problems.
BayesiaLab software2 was used to construct the Bayesian network. This tool
for modelling Bayesian networks has many features and an intuitive graphical
interface.
The SARGOS Bayesian network was developed in two stages, described below:
ﬁrst an initial network was constructed using data from an established, profes-
sional database, and then the ﬁnal network was built using expert knowledge
from the ﬁeld.
2 The BayesiaLab software has been developed by the French company Bayesia
(http://www.bayesia.com/).
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3.1 Construction of a Bayesian Network from Database Content
The ﬁrst stage exploited data from the Piracy and Armed Robbery database
of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). It is the only database in
existence that holds records (dating from 1994 ) of pirate attacks in the maritime
environment. On 15 th July, 2011 this database held 5,502 records and recorded
the following information for each attack: the name of the asset targeted, the
number of people involved, the type of weapon used, the measures taken by the
crew to protect themselves, the impact on the crew and pirates, etc.
From this data the BayesiaLab software automatically generates a Bayesian
network and suggests dependency relationships between the main elements found
in the database. This study of the contents of the database made it possible to de-
ﬁne the principle countermeasures adopted by the majority of entities attacked,
namely: engage evasive manoeuvres, activate the Ship Security Alarm System
(SSAS), contact the security vessel, move the crew to a safe location, and turn
on the searchlight, etc.
These modalities and conditional probabilities were then used to construct
the expert knowledge Bayesian network.
Figure 2 shows the Bayesian network created from the database content. In-
formation such as longitude, latitude, name of the asset targeted, etc. was not
used as data was not available for all attacks.
Fig. 2. The Bayesian network constructed from IMO data
In its initial form, the probability distribution of the nodes shows that most
ships that come under attack are bulk carriers or tankers (this raw data does
not reﬂect the application of constraints relating to particular attacks).
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66.39 percent of attacks occur in international waters; this is due to the lack of
security controls. Equally often, pirates proﬁt from attacking in numbers: 60.39
percent of attacks are organized by pirate teams consisting of more than ﬁve
people.
This network provides a very clear view of the pirates tactics, how they are
armed, and above all the number of people involved.
The following example demonstrates how the network can be used to simulate
a particular attack scenario. In the example, speciﬁc modalities are set for nodes
that characterize an attack:
– The asset targeted: a tanker
– The location of the incident: international waters
– Type of attackers: thieves
– Type of weapons: armed personnel.
This makes it possible to identify the countermeasures used. The Bayesian net-
work indicates that in this situation, the robbers ﬁred shots at the potential
target and that the crew, in order to protect themselves, tried to apply evasive
manoeuvres and used high-pressure ﬁre hoses on the attackers.
The Bayesian network created from the IMO data made it possible to make
an initial assessment of the main tools and protection measures used by a crew
under attack to protect themselves, to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of these tools,
and to determine the probability of certain types of attack.
Secondly, the use of this database made it possible to test the functionality of
the BayesiaLab tool and establish the feasibility of creating a Bayesian network
from existing data.
3.2 Construction of a Bayesian Network from Expert Knowledge
The ﬁrst stage of the project was to construct a Bayesian network from the
IMO data. In the second stage, expert knowledge from the marine community
was used to construct the network. Civil and military experts in the maritime
domain shared their experiences and opinions during successive brainstorming
sessions to deﬁne the variables (Bayesian network nodes) and connections (links
between nodes) of the system. As a result of this expert knowledge the initial
conditional probabilities were set. These probabilities were then updated through
an iterative process in which many scenarios were simulated in order to verify,
and if necessary reﬁne, the values which had been set for each node.
The principle is the following: when an object is detected by radar in the
vicinity of an oil ﬁeld, a set of variables is determined and calculated in order to
identify and assess the potential danger. Such information includes, for example,
the speed at which the object is moving, visibility, time of day, longitude and
latitude of the object and the target etc.
This data is used to calculate the distance between the target and the moving
object, and the time required for the intervention of the security vessel. This
information is recorded in an alert report and each object detected is allocated
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a unique identiﬁer. The SARGOS system only generates this report when the
threat is identiﬁed as suspicious or hostile.
The basic architecture of the SARGOS response planning network consists
of ﬁve modules and four sub-modules. The deﬁnition and the scope of each
of these ﬁve modules are directly related to the meaning of the nodes that
constitute them. The modules are classiﬁed as: basic parameters, the overall
danger level of the situation, aggravating factors and constraints, nodes related
to communication and distress calls and countermeasures. These are described
in detail below.
The Basic Parameters. These are static or dynamic physical data that char-
acterize the threat and the target. They are the direct result of, or are derived
from, the intermediate calculations of the alert report. They constitute the mini-
mum data necessary to create a model that is still suﬃciently detailed to permit
a full understanding of the threat and the target, and the issues involved in
responding to an attack. These parameters include, for example, the identity of
the threat IdentityClass (suspicious or hostile), the distance between the threat
and the target DTG Threat/Asset, the criticality of the target AssetAssessment.
Four modalities are deﬁned for this node: critical, major, signiﬁcant and other.
The Overall Danger Level of the Situation. The overall danger level of the
situation is derived from the basic parameters. The node ShowGradationLevel
is the formalization of this module in the Bayesian network. The grading system
uses levels 1-4 (1 being least serious, 4 being most serious). This level, and the
planning of countermeasures, is constantly adapted to each situation.
Aggravating Factors and Constraints. Aggravating factors and constraints
are both internal and external elements of the system.
Aggravating factors make it possible to take into account a potential deteri-
oration in the situation and thus to anticipate potential planning options. They
represent the environment, for example the visibility (Visibility) and the time of
day (PeriodOfDay).
Constraints are represented by parameters that reﬂect the eﬀectiveness of the
response both technically and operationally. Technical constraints are directly
related to the use of countermeasures and include factors such as their availability
(ImmediateReadiness) or the potential for remote control (RemoteControlled).
Communication and Distress Calls. Communication and the distress call
are two indispensable resources called upon in response to a threat. Internal com-
munication at the target can be used to notify all relevant personnel (e.g. inform
the Oﬀshore Installation Manager, InformOIM), while external communication
operates at various levels to alert the various actors involved in safety at sea (for
example, to request the intervention of security vessels RequestSecurityVessels,
or activate the Ship Safety Alarm System, RaiseSSAS). This communication
makes it possible for oil ﬁeld installations and shipping to prepare their response
and to ask, where possible, for outside intervention.
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Countermeasures. This refers to the set of defensive measures implemented
when the target is attacked, in order to protect itself against an identiﬁed threat.
They are the concrete expression of the response and provide a set of means and
actions to normalize the situation as quickly as possible following an attack.
The countermeasures module is divided into four sub-modules which are the
core of the concept of a graduated response as they oﬀ er increasingly forceful
countermeasures depending on the nature of the detected threat: they include
deterrence and low-impact repulsion measures; repulsion, anti-boarding and neu-
tralization measures; management of procedures, and ensuring the safety and
security of the facility. They are described in detail below.
Deterrence and Low-Impact Repulsion Measures. These inform attackers that
the target is aware of their intentions, that the target is able to follow the
attackers and the target has no interest in taking action. Low-impact repulsion
is the ability of the target to repel the attack using relatively low impact means
such as searchlights, high-pressure ﬁre hoses or Long Range Acoustic Devices
(ActivateLRAD).
Repulsion, Anti-boarding and Neutralization Measures. These are high-impact
countermeasures, whose main function is at least to mitigate if not neutralize at-
tackers. The node EngageRepellentEquipment encompasses a growing number of
resources available on the maritime piracy market that make it possible to repel
an attack at a distance, while respecting the principle of non-lethal self-defence.
The main function of anti-boarding measures, as with repulsion equipment, is
to prevent attackers from being able to board should they approach the facility
or ship.
The role of SetCrowdControlMunition is to delay the progress of the attackers
to the point of exhaustion, or even neutralize them and so allow maximum time
for the crew to deploy other safety actions.
Procedure Management. This consists of the following countermeasures:
The CrewMangement node refers to the sounding of crew action-stations, and
for the crew to immediately report to their pre-assigned post or station on the
installation.
The AssetAssaultManagement node relates to the management of safety and
security at the potential target. The modalities of this node are: withdrawal
to a designated safe room, evasive manoeuvres (on mobile units and ships),
and activating the security station (this consists of particular procedures to be
followed by individual crew members when the alarm is raised).
Ensuring the Safety and Security of the Facility. As is the case with procedure
management the SARGOS system includes action plans for the management
of production equipment in order to safely shut it down, and deny access to
sensitive areas.
Conditional Probabilities. In the Bayesian network, each module or sub-
module consists of one or many nodes that all have an eﬀect on each other.
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Each node consists of a matrix of conditional probabilities that are calculated
by taking into account the various inﬂuences between nodes and the actual
situation represented by the node itself.
The probabilities of the base nodes are normalized, i.e. elements that would
characterize a speciﬁc attack have not been added.
4 Discussion
When the probability distribution of the diﬀerent modalities has been estab-
lished, and the Bayesian network has been developed, various attack scenarios
can be simulated. Once the initial conditions have been determined, the network
translates them into a response report. Experiments with diﬀerent potential
scenarios enabled the network to be ﬁnalised before it was integrated into the
SARGOS system.
4.1 Attack Scenario Case Studies
The following two examples demonstrate what happens when parameters are set
to simulate an attack on a Floating Production, Storage and Oﬄoading (FPSO)
unit, which is considered to be a critical asset. Figure 3 describes the ﬁrst scenario
where an unknown vessel creates the threat.
The parameters that were set to reproduce the scenario on an FPSO are:
the identity class of the threat, the ranking between the threat and the target
(Ranking Threat/Asset, which corresponds to the time in seconds required for
the threat to travel the remaining distance to the target), the distance between
the threat and the target (DTG Threat/Asset, in meters), the security vessel
response time (TTG SecurityVessels/Asset, in seconds), the time of day and the
visibility. The simulation shows that the danger level of this situation is 2, with
a percentage of 64.68. In this case the countermeasures to be applied are: inform
the boatswain, request the intervention of a security vessel, send a clear, strong
message using a long-range loudspeaker, activate the searchlight, activate the
security station, and activate repulsion equipment. Planning is tailored to the
danger level of the situation and evolves in response to changes in the parameters
relating to the threat and the target. In the second scenario the attacker is now
hostile, armed and equipped with a highly manoeuvrable boat. This high-threat
scenario is described in Figure 4.
In this scenario, the danger level is 4, with a percentage of 79.79. Figure 5
illustrates the adapted response plan. This level of danger requires internal and
external communications (BroadcastField and ActivateDistressCall) but more
importantly, a more vigorous response demonstrated by the following counter-
measures: assemble the crew (CrewManagement), activate the security station
(AssetAssaultManagement), ensure the safety and security of the production
facility (EngageESDS), block access to sensitive areas (ShutLockAccesses) and
delay the progress of the attackers (SetCrowdControlMunition). Finally, a low-
impact repulsion measure such as the Long Range Acoustic Device (ActivateL-
RAD) is put on stand-by.
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Fig. 3. Observations set for scenario1
Fig. 4. Observations set for scenario2
Fig. 5. Simulation of a high-threat scenario on an FPSO
Generating attack scenarios in this way helps to reﬁne the probability distri-
bution and tests the response of the Bayesian network to changes in parameters
(the threat, the target, the environment, etc.).
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4.2 Integration of the Bayesian Network into the SARGOS System
In order to integrate the Bayesian network into the SARGOS system, a prototype
was developed that took as input an alert report and generated as output a
response plan. The response plan contains all the countermeasures to be applied
either by the crew or automatically by the system. Once the countermeasures
(whose probability exceeds the activation threshold) have been selected, they
are displayed in the response plan in a speciﬁc order. The main factors that
determine the order are: the action mode of the countermeasure, its ease of
implementation, the extent to which it is automated (or the need for a large
number of people to activate it), the time needed for it to become eﬀective, and
any potential additional functions.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
The SARGOS system responds to an alert report with a response plan, which is
the result of an intelligent analysis of the alert report. This response plan brings
together the information necessary for the physical installation to protect itself
against a threat.
An initial constraint of the project is met, as all the countermeasures are
non-lethal responses.
The use of a Bayesiannetwork for the planning of the response is amajor asset of
the SARGOS systemas this network can handle all possible combinations of threat
characteristics, the target under attack, environment, crewmanagement and facil-
ities. Most importantly, it adapts to changes in the danger level of the situation.
Finally, the network is able to integrate feedback from attacks that has pre-
viously been used to administer and can therefore evolve. Consequently, the
planning module can be modiﬁed and improved iteratively.
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